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When John F. Kennedy spoke in Berlin in 1963, he stirred
popular feeling as no American President visiting Europe had done
since Woodrow Wilson arrived in Paris in 1918. Arthur Schlesinger
recalled in A Thousand Days that Kennedy was greeted by "threefifths of the population of West Berlin streaming into the streets,
clapping, waving, crying, cheering, as if it were the second coming."
Later he appeared before a "seething crowd in the Rudolf Wilde
Platz, compressed into a single excited, impassioned mass ...
[that] shook itself and rose and roared like an animal."' His remarks were brief but powerful, with a famous peroration:
"All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin,
and therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words 'Ich bin
ein Berliner.'" The hysteria spread almost visibly through the
square. Kennedy was first exhilarated, then disturbed; he felt,
as he remarked on his return, that if he had said, "March to
the wall-tear it down," his listeners would have marched.2
He didn't, of course, and it is likely that even Jean-Frangois Revel
would not have had him do so. But Revel would be ready with a
far-reaching explanation of why he did not: democracies, in his
view, always pull their punches.
Explaining this phenomenon is the purpose of How Democra3 to "lay bare [the] mechanism" by
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inexorably losing ground to the Soviet Union. "[T]he mechanism
of international relations and world opinion is so rigged," he declares, "that in almost every situation it imposes an almost insurmountable initial handicap on the West."'4 Worse, it seems that the
democracies have half-consciously abetted their own decline:
"Didn't we secretly hope," he asks, "to be forever spared the painful choice between resignation and firmness simply by stripping
ourselves of the means to be firm?"5 Better, then, to leave the Berlin Wall alone.
As Revel's question suggests, he believes that the poor competitive performance of free societies is written into their very
structure and into democratic psychology. Contradicting Tocqueville, he finds diversity rather than uniformity to be the West's
crippling weakness.0 Diversity makes the hard decisions that foreign policy requires that much harder.' At the same time, the
broad internal success of democratic capitalism seems in the end to
breed feelings of purposelessness.8 As a result, Western elites lose
any appetite for struggle. They are misled by the legal techniques
for resolving conflict within or among democracies and are lured by
dreams of resolving their disagreements with Soviet totalitarianism
permanently, at a single stroke.9
Against such a divided, weak-minded adversary, the tasks of
Soviet foreign policy become almost absurdly simple. Whenever
negotiated agreements with the West are possible, these can be
used to make all previous Soviet gains legitimate under international law, and thereby irreversible. 10 This was the great Soviet opportunity opened by detente, which Revel terms "not a dream,
[but] a trap."" Yet even when relations with the West are confrontational and negotiations falter, the Soviets have no incentive
to turn back or retrench. By pressing ahead, they can exploit
Western divisiveness: "Whether Moscow is faced with a difficult
situation in Poland or in Afghanistan or in its own economy counts
for very little in its ledger . . . since every crisis in the East ends
cross-reference as
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with the weakening of the West."12 In their squabbling selfishness,
self-delusion, and self-denigration, the democracies cannot win for
losing.
I

WHY CAN'T DEMOCRACIES BARGAIN BETTER?

This, for Revel, is how democracies perish. In fact, the moment may be close at hand. Seen historically, he says, the era of
free, pluralist societies may prove a "brief parenthesis that is closing before our eyes."13
The West's conduct since the outset of detente plays a very
large part in this indictment. To Revel's credit, however, his critique is not confined to a single decade; had it been, the analysis
would have been still more familiar and predictable than it is.
Rather than limit himself to the 1970's, he has surveyed-very selectively-the entire postwar period, only to find that the West has
been doing badly for a long time. Unfortunately, his charges are
not always made more plausible simply by being made more
sweeping.
As Revel widens his historical focus, he can hardly deny that
the Western record shows some successes. His complaint seems to
be that these have never been big enough to change the East-West
relationship fundamentally. Instead, even at the height of the Cold
War, the West contented itself with denying (or "containing") the
most aggressive Soviet ambitions. And when successful, it did not
follow up by inflicting the kind of penalties that would seriously
hobble Soviet policy in the future.1 4 As a result, the worst that
Moscow has had to fear is coming out even. Obviously, such a pattern does nothing to strengthen deterrence.
This rough sketch of the ground rules of the East-West competition is close enough to the facts to be recognizable. But what
Revel must show is that these limits on the West's effectiveness
could have been overcome by other policies, free of democracy's
characteristic flaws. This he fails to do. It might be, after all, that
to force the other side to retreat is simply much more costly and
risky than denying it new gains. Even some of his own examples
suggest this possibility. Thus he invokes the Korean War to prove
that Soviet-supported aggression has never been adequately penal-
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ized, 15 as though American forces had not in fact swept north to
the Yalu. After six months of war, they were in effect on the verge
of dismantling a Communist state. What kept this from happening
was the unexpected onslaught of Chinese forces, who drove the
Americans back to the 38th parallel and an armistice. 16 It was perhaps the West, rather than the Soviet bloc, that had not learned
the risk of trying to do better than come out even.
In Korea, moreover, it was at least easy to define what pushing
harder might mean: the application of increased military force. A
policy for following up on some of the other Western successes that
Revel mentions would have been harder to devise. He argues, for
example, that after the Berlin airlift in 1949, the West should have
demanded that the Soviet Union negotiate an acceptable World
War II settlement. "There certainly would have been nothing immoral about using our atomic monopoly to force Stalin to agree to
a German peace treaty."' 17 Nothing immoral perhaps, but exactly
how to "force" Stalin would have been another matter.' 8 In all
likelihood, Soviet negotiators would have sought to ride out
whatever threats were made by the West.
Revel himself inadvertently explains this in another section of
the book, where he admits the difficulty of using nuclear weapons
for peacetime diplomatic purposes.' 9 He lets this admission slip because, although it weakens his critique of American policy in the
Cold War, it strengthens his insistence that the West is wholly paralyzed today. Having lamented the fact that the Soviet Union is
currently acquiring nuclear superiority, he then goes on to acknowledge that the more important change has already taken
place: even a rough equality between the two sides is, in his view,
enough to cancel America's nuclear deterrent.2 0 A page later, he
goes further still, observing that even if the West had retained nuclear superiority, it would be in no better position to counter the
array of problems that Soviet policy creates (e.g., support for "national liberation movements" and for terrorism). Although countering these is merely a defensive problem for the West, it remains
inordinately difficult. By contrast, forcing the Soviet Union to ac-
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cept something that directly harmed its interests-like a World
War II settlement that reversed Soviet control over Eastern Europe-would have been an offensive problem and vastly harder to
solve, whether the West had an atomic monopoly or not.2 1
Other writers have suggested how this might have been done.
Adam Ulam, for example, has argued that in the 1950's and 1960's
the one way to secure major Soviet concessions would have been to
make serious bargaining use of Germany's rearmament, especially
of its nuclear option.22 A threat to give West Germany nuclear
weapons would certainly have gotten Moscow's attention; if credible, it might have made it very difficult-though far from impossible-for the Soviet side to stall. Still, whatever its chances of success, the reason (which Ulam explains fully) that something like
this was not tried had far more to do with the hostility and suspicions of the other Western allies toward Germany than with any
peculiarly democratic weakness. Revel's French countrymen know
this best: they refused to permit even an integrated conventional
defense, let alone a cooperative nuclear one.
There have been other periods of Soviet vulnerability that, in
Revel's view, created opportunities for very tough bargaining.
Before offering Lend-Lease assistance to Stalin when he was attacked by Nazi Germany, he says, the West should have insisted
on specific postwar commitments from the Soviet Union ("goodconduct guarantees"). 23 And later, after Stalin's death, when the
Soviet leadership was plainly unsure of itself and the balance of
power strongly favored the West, a renewed demand for free elections in Eastern Europe (promised at Yalta, after all) would have
'24
been "eminently realistic.
These suggestions raise an interesting and important problem.
As Revel points out, the bargaining situation did clearly favor the
West, but the clearest conclusion to be drawn from this is the difficulty of translating abstract "bargaining advantages" into enduring
gains. Stalin, facing the invasion of the German army in 1941,
might well have agreed to almost anything, specific or not, but
that hardly guaranteed that he would abide by the agreement.
Moreover, whether he would renege could not have been clear for
some time: he could not implement an agreement on the spot, not
21 See id. at 71.
22 See ADAM ULAM, EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE 504-12, 619-20 (1968); see also ADAM
ULAM, THE RIVALS: AMERICA AND RUSSIA SINCE WORLD WAR II 289-91 (1971).
2'See REVEL at 272-73.
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yet having conquered Eastern Europe. The West, in fact, would
have been obliged to help him conquer his neighbors merely to enable him to keep his promises later. By that point, of course, he
would have been equally in a position not to keep them, just as he
was at the end of the war when he did not abide by the commitments he made at \Yalta.25
In short, bargaining with Stalin when he was still weak rather
than waiting until he was strong would not necessarily have
changed the outcome. In negotiating with the Soviets, the West
has to seek concessions and agreements that constrain Soviet foreign policy not only in a period of weakness, but also when the
power balance becomes more advantageous to Moscow. Measures
that can be reversed easily (and at low cost to the Soviets) are of
much less value. Revel understands this: in his analysis of the
1950's, the gains that he believes the West should have
sought-such as the creation of democratic regimes in Eastern Europe-certainly would, if attained, have been very hard to reverse.
But these were also the concessions that the Soviet leadership
would have been least likely to make.
If in 1941 the West had trouble translating its bargaining
power into permanent gains because Stalin would have agreed to
anything, in the 1950's the problem was reversed: Stalin's successors would agree to nothing. Revel is very imaginative in devising
opening gambits for the West, but he rarely asks what the Soviet
side could or would do to circumvent them. He has looked back
over the past in search of the one big lost opportunity. In so doing,
however, he seems to have succumbed to the very ailment that he
decries in his fellow democrats, who wish for "sweeping, definitive
treaties that organize the world for generations to come."2 6
For all the breadth of Revel's historical analysis, there is a
very strange omission in his retelling of how the West has coped
with the Soviet challenge. He is right that the Cold War was conducted along "astoundingly moderate lines. 2' 7 Yet he ignores the

"IIt should be noted that Revel could have made a more powerful version of his case
had he wanted to do so. The real upshot of his argument is that Western interests were not
served by the clear victory that the Red Army won. He could have said that the West, even
while allied with Stalin, should have tried to keep him from becoming strong enough to
break his commitments, i.e., to keep him from winning outright. He does not make this case,
in part because there would have been the gravest questions about the prudence of such a
course. In general, Revel's arguments suggest that the West could do much better on the
cheap-without significantly more dangerous or more costly policies.
,6 REVEL at 106.
17 Id. at 250.
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prevailing atmosphere of popular anxiety that accompanied this
moderation and made possible an unprecedented (certainly for the
United States) peacetime mobilization of psychological and material resources. As a result, the power balance was probably more
favorable to the West than it ever would be again. Nevertheless,
the Western outlook was not smug and insular, not complacently
indifferent to the prospect of Soviet pressure, and-perhaps most
important-not drawn to meet the narrowest requirements of selfprotection. Far from it: the Truman Doctrine, one of the earliest
statements of the policy of containment, is remembered today
above all for its unexpectedly universal definition of Western
security:
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation
must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is
too often not a free one.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States
to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.2"
This outlook did not disappear overnight. Revel scorns the "pompous" rhetoric of Kennedy, 2 but the promise to "bear any burden
• . . to assure the survival and the success of liberty" had real
meaning for American foreign policy. Without it, it is hard to imagine the scale of American commitment to Vietnam-another
subject that seems to interest Revel little.
The universalism of the' Cold War was both ambitious and
anxious. Its policies need explanation just as much as the
blindered vision of detente. And they are particularly important in
correcting an analysis, such as Revel's, that treats the latter period
as the one true expression of democratic foreign policy. Because
Revel does not recognize the policies of the Cold War as an alternative expression of democratic foreign policy, he does not have to
explain whether there is a relation between the two, or whether the
one produced the other. To pursue such an explanation would suggest a very different perspective-not that free societies are
doomed by their diplomacy, but that their diplomacy alternates
from one extreme condition to another.
28 JOHN LEWIS GADDIs, THE UNITED STATES. AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, 19411947, at 351 (1972) (quoting President Harry S. Truman's speech before Congress on Mar.
12, 1947).
29 See REVEL at 239.
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A study of the extreme fears and goals of policy during the
Cold War may also help to answer a question that does interest
Revel: why the West, even when it was both zealous and strong,
failed to make real gains at the expense of the Soviet Union. The
"astounding moderation" of the Cold War may, paradoxically,
have quite a lot to. do with its other face, the heights of anxiety
that it created. Why was the bare-knuckled bargaining that Revel
advocates not a part of the West's policy in the Cold War? Not
least because fears of the other side's trickery were so great, and
because negotiation was thought likely to confuse a mobilized
public.
At the peak of mobilization, democracies may fail to make the
most of their strengths. This conclusion does suggest a weakness of
democratic foreign policy, but not one that fits the extreme conclusions that Revel prefers. For him, democracy's failings make its
strengths irrelevant.
II.

BETWEEN PERISHING AND PREVAILING

The foibles of democratic foreign policy do not prove that democracies must perish. Why should the struggle between the two
systems have a tidy outcome? Any number of other outcomes are
possible, as Revel himself suggests in criticizing European complacency about the Soviet Union. "[Western Europeans] are wrong to
think the only alternative facing them is invasion by the Red Army
3' 0
or total freedom. Conditional liberty is also a possibility.
This is a crucial, but still too limited observation. The possible
patterns are far more numerous than these three alone. It is easy
to sketch out a spectrum of intermediate possibilities. Short of
"conditional liberty," for example, there is what might be called
constrained foreign policy, in which internal affairs remain unfettered, and independence is unimpaired, but a country's external
freedom of maneuver erodes because it bases every decision on a
desire to avoid difficulties with the Soviet Union. Short of this situation is one in which there are other constraints on foreign policy,
primarily of a rhetorical kind. A policy of disingenuous truckling to
the Soviet Union has its advocates, especially (but not only) in Europe. Its watchword: make abundant symbolic concessions to Moscow while trying to avoid any real change in conduct or real sacrifice of interests.
Further down the spectrum are still other possibilities. While
'o
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retaining their freedom, for example, the democracies may compromise their interests by failing to make use of all available assets.
And even further, by failing to make the best use of those assets.
These categories imply different degrees of success in seizing unexpected opportunities or in balancing the investments required by
foreign policy with competing domestic claims. A too wasteful foreign policy will be hard to sustain.
Finally, a truly valuable measure of a democracy's foreign policy performance must reflect trends. The meaning of what Revel
calls "conditional liberty" is, for example, very different depending
on how stable it is. In certain instances it might be nothing more
than a way-station toward an outright loss of liberty; under other
circumstances, it might be an enduring condition. The defeatists
who are Revel's real target presumably will accept a state of conditional liberty because they think it will not grow worse; others
would argue that it can only grow worse. Similarly, if a country's
policy is characterized by nothing worse than rhetorical concessions to the Soviet Union, the most important question concerns
its future direction: is the policy headed toward real concessions, or
not?
Such a wider spectrum of possibilities is a corrective to Revel's
more extreme analysis, but it also makes it possible to make use of
some of his insights that would otherwise be neglected. Those who
doubt that democracies are in imminent danger of "perishing" may
ignore the more serious questions that he also means to raise: How
well are the democracies doing? Where on this continuum of possibilities are they now? Where are they headed?
It is all the more important to raise these questions because
Revel's apocalyptic views about the future of Communist systems
are extremely unconvincing. He announces: "[T]he prime question
of our time is which of . . . two events will take place first: the
destruction of democracy by communism or communism's death of
1
its own sickness?"'
Perhaps predictably, it turns out that these two possibilities
produce exactly the same problem for the West because Communism will try to stave off sickness through expansion. For Revel,
when Communism is healthy it expands; when sick, it expands.
There is no relief for democracies here. Totalitarian regimes, he
says, "are systems whose survival depends at every second on a
' 3' 2
plan for world domination, both as fantasm and as realpolitik.
11
32
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He depicts an inherently aggressive Soviet appetite, joined to a
permanent Soviet vulnerability. If the expansionist tide ever turns
against it, the Communist system will be in deep trouble. This is
"how totalitarian states perish."
Immediately after 1917, of course, the Bolsheviks themselves
believed in their \vulnerability. They feared that unless their
revolution spread quickly through Europe, the most important
capitalist states would unite to crush the new Soviet regime. Discovering that this was not true brought both disappointment and
relief, a double meaning present in Stalin's slogan "Socialism in
One Country." 33
It is far from clear, however, that such extreme vulnerability
persists to the present day, least of all if democratic foreign policies are as enfeebled as Revel insists. He does not argue, as others
do, that only foreign-policy success confers "legitimacy" on the regime in the eyes of the Soviet people. He can hardly say this, for in
his view nothing could confer popular legitimacy on such a system;
the people of the Soviet Union know this best. Revel, then, needs a
different way of explaining why the Soviet regime remains vulnerable to collapse, tracing it instead to a lack of self-confidence on the
part of the Soviet elite. It seems that they find it hard to sustain
the enormous effort required to repress the people, in the face of
continuing evidence that they do not like being repressed. "Think
of the cost of spying on people, of hemming them in, of jamming
airwaves, of censoring printed matter, speech and telecommunications-in short, the cost of maintaining the vast, parasitic bureaucracy trained in surveillance and repression." 4
This extremely peculiar argument finds psychological weakness at the center of the Soviet system. Yet it does very little to
establish that the system would literally not survive without expansionism. Failure to expand, Revel says, would hurt morale. Are
we to believe that the KGB, the world's single largest organ of repression, cannot survive bouts of poor morale? Or that it does not
daily surmount more serious threats to morale than this? He does
not explain. 5
33 On this slogan, see 1 JOSEPH STALIN, LENINISM 296-308 (1933) (discussing the possi-

bility and meaning of "socialism in one country");
COUNTRY,

EDWARD HALLMT CARR,SOCIALISM IN ONE
1924-1926, at 22, 178, 180-81, 305, 352 (1958) (discussing Stalin's advocacy of the

concept).
31 REVEL
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In fact, Revel thoroughly contradicts himself. At the outset of the book, he is much
taken with Soviet cognitive dissonance. He insists that Communists are prey to "the humiliating, stabbing certainty that as long as a non-Communist society exists anywhere in the
"
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IMPERIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES

Because there is little chance that either the democratic or Soviet regimes will soon perish, the questions that most need to be
answered are much less dramatic than the one Revel poses. They
are: How best to compete? What are each side's distinctive
strengths and weaknesses? The answers to these questions suggest
that while Revel may have exaggerated how much better the democracies could have done in the past, particularly during the Cold
War, in assessing their competitive prospects for the future he is
far too pessimistic.
In How Democracies Perish, free societies and totalitarian

states are a perfect mismatch: democracies with near limitless internal strength, but disabled in foreign affairs; totalitarian regimes
with enormous assets to use on the international stage, but plagued
by failure at home. This is a familiar, and in some ways unexceptionable, contrast. But Revel's prescriptions for how to compete remain decisively colored by his apocalyptic views. This is true
whether he is discussing economic warfare or the clash of
ideologies.
While acknowledging that they cannot replace military
strength in importance, Revel lends support to policies that will
exploit the economic weakness of the Soviet bloc-at a minimum,
to prevent the subsidy of East-West trade by the West and to stem
the transfer of sensitive technologies. As a way of coping with Soviet expansionism, he describes this as a policy of "pressure on the
center" rather than on the periphery, where expansion actually occurs. Its goal: "to slow [Soviet] expansionism by trying to wither
the trunk instead of rushing around trying to lop off the tips of the
branches, for these are too luxuriant a growth to keep up
imperial
8
with."
There is a dizzying tangle of inconsistencies in this analysis.
The approach Revel sets out here is, first of all, inconsistent with
his own observation on the Soviets' immunity from the trade-offs
that plague popular government: "The democracies trim their miliworld, the empire's subjects will try to escape to it, or at least will dream of escaping." Only
imperialism can ease such anxiety: "[T]he only way to convince oneself and the rest of humanity that the socialist system is best is to see to it that there are no other systems." Id. at
90-91. Hundreds of pages later, however, he reverts to the opposite, more conventional,
view. "Unlike the Western leadership, which is tormented by remorse and a sense of guilt,
Soviet leaders' consciences are perfectly clear, which allows them to use brute force with
utter serenity both to preserve their power at home and to extend it abroad." Id. at 354-55.
36
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tary spending when the economy goes sour; the Communist countries do not."3 7 If the latter statement were true, then of course the
effectiveness of Western economic pressure on the Soviet Union
would be greatly reduced. As it happens, however, the statement is
false. In fact, over the past decade, the rate of growth in Soviet
defense spending has lessened.3 8 This is hardly surprising: no one
responsible for a program of world domination can simply ignore
his resource base. Yet those who romanticize Soviet omnipotence
will constantly find themselves in this or similar logical binds. In
this instance, for example, Revel favors economic pressure in part
because he also exaggerates the effectiveness of Soviet policy in the
Third World, to which he believes resistance is pointless. For him,
new Soviet regimes appear like crabgrass-unstoppable-in the
lawn of a stable, democratic world order.
To be sure, trying to control these "luxuriant growths" has its
difficulties, but Revel does not examine the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Soviet system thoroughly enough. On the face of it,
empires seem much more likely to be weak at the periphery than
at the center. Lenin, it should be recalled, found world capitalism
especially vulnerable in its most extended positions.3 9 In many of
their colonies, despite superficial control, the Western powers had
not put down roots; they had, in fact, given rise to new nationalisms. Revel wants to turn Lenin on his head, preferring a longterm strategy of slowing down Soviet policy by chipping away marginally at Soviet growth rates. In doing so, he treats a number of
factors as near-absolute: the solidity of pro-Soviet regimes in the
Third World, the payoffs for Soviet policy in continuing to sponsor
them, and Soviet determination to continue sponsoring them even
if the payoffs decline. Tfie past several years have raised questions
about all of these.
"' Id. at 19.

18 See Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1983:Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on InternationalTrade, Finance, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Comm., 98th Cong., lst Sess. 230 (1984) (statement of Robert Gates, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency) (growth of Soviet defense costs declined from average annual rate of four to five
percent from 1966 through 1976 to about two percent after 1976; Soviet expenditures for
procurement of military hardware were almost flat from 1976 through 1981).
39 See his remark, "the West is digging its grave in the East," quoted in STANLEY
PAGE,
LENIN AND WORLD REvOLUTION 153 (1972). It was a prime argument of Lenin's work on
imperialism that the European powers were able to defuse tensions at home through expansionism. "Imperialism has the tendency to create privileged sections even among the workers, and to detach them from the main proletarian masses." VLADIMIR I. LENIN, IMPERIALISM:
THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM 106 (new rev. trans. 1939).
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A second issue on which Revel's position is influenced by his
extreme conclusions about Communism's and democracy's relative
strengths is that of political ideas, or ideology. While envying the
brilliance and skill of Soviet disinformation and propaganda, he
nevertheless expresses opposition to "[t]he recurrent idea of an
'ideological counterattack.' ",40 This, in his view, would subvert one
of the purposes for which democracies oppose communism in the
first place-the avoidance of intellectual rigidity. "Ideology is a lie,
Communist ideology is a total lie extended to all aspects of
41
reality."
Because of the vehemence of his anti-Communism, Revel
would in ordinary parlance be thought an "ideologue," and his position on this issue clarifies his outlook as a whole. In strict terms
his views are anti-ideological; he recoils at "inventing a systematized counterfantasy. ' '42 This is to his credit. All the same, his principled opposition to "ideological counterattack" seems designed to
confirm his practical diagnosis: that the West is paralyzed. Heaving a long sigh, he observes that the democracies both lack a true
ideological weapon and are unlikely to succeed at the much more
difficult task of fighting "the spread of utopian notions with plain
facts. '43 This is intellectual consistency in the service of political
despair.
In spite of his despair, Revel's own analysis of the ideological
struggle between the two systems suggests some of the West's
vigor. If, for example, it does not have an ideological "church," it
also has less fear of heretics. By contrast, the security of the East
is always at issue because it cannot be wholly separated from ideological conformity. This is the lesson of the Sino-Soviet schism,
and also the reason that Eastern Europe is a source of Soviet anxiety-less because the Soviet Union fears invasion than because it
fears heresy.
Similarly, Revel concludes that any non-Communist country
in the world "can accede to democracy," without wholly losing its
distinctive historical character.44 This may be because democracy
doesn't sink too deep and is therefore not fundamentally at war
with a society's traditional order. Here he probably underestimates
the revolutionary disorder that democratic modernization can cre-

40
41
42
43

41

162.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163.
See id. at 345.
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ate, but his argument also identifies a strength of the democratic
principle. He is right that the allies of democracy may never share
(as the communiques of the Soviet bloc always put it) "a complete
identity of views."'45 But perhaps for this very reason they are potentially much more numerous: less is asked of them. If so, the
sources of world-wide resistance to Soviet Communism's much
more complete, disruptive revolution are also very great. The growing number, now oft-remarked, of armed insurgencies against
Communist regimes represents a kind of refutation of Revel. They
suggest that even without a doctrinal alternative as comprehensive
as Marxism-Leninism, the West can still fight back. By contrast,
the intellectual route Revel travels leads him to a gloomier forecast. He both laments the absence and resists the creation of a fullblown ideological alternative, and prefers to think that without it
the West cannot fight at all.
CONCLUSION

Revel is a believer in democracy but not in its strengths. He
finds that free societies have never done very well against Communist opponents, and that they are not likely to do much better in
the future. His own analysis suggests one of the reasons: while urging fellow democrats to recognize the vulnerabilities of the Soviet
bloc, he proceeds to close off many of the most promising possibilities in the course of his analysis. This is how foreign policies
perish.

" See id. at 41, 162.

